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May 3-2-3
EO-9320

172

29 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Training

SUBJECT : Report of Performance of JOI [REDACTED]

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1. [REDACTED] was assigned to ONE in October 1954. He was assigned to the [REDACTED] of the Estimates Staff where he worked through December 1954. He spent the period January - July 1955 on familiarization and training assignments in NSA and OCI. He returned in August 1955 and was reassigned to the Far [REDACTED]

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2. [REDACTED] initial tour in this office was primarily for purposes of familiarization. He nevertheless made useful contributions to the work then in progress.

3. Although [REDACTED] assignment to OCI and NSA was primarily for the purpose of training and familiarization, he actually performed at the level of an experienced intelligence officer.

4. In NSA he spent about four months on a special project which involved linguistic interpretation of a relatively unexploited type of primary intelligence material. At the same time he worked for OCI (and CIA generally) in determining the intelligence value of this material and made recommendations to several components of CIA suggesting greater exploitation of it. These recommendations were incorporated into a formal request of AD/CI to the Director of NSA for upgrading the priority of this type of material in the over-all NSA effort, which request was favorably acted upon. Throughout the tour at NSA, he returned on Friday afternoons to the Soviet Staff of OCI in order to check their files and familiarize himself with their needs and procedures.

5. Early in May 1955 [REDACTED] returned to OCI for a period of about three and a half months. There he spent about six weeks in the internal Soviet division of OCI and began a survey of developments in Soviet ideology since the writers' congress of December 1954.

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This study was based on a reading of Soviet papers, journals, proceedings of congresses, etc., many of which had been unexploited because of lack of personnel versed in Russian and lack of final responsibility in the intelligence community for evaluation and exploitation of principal Russian periodicals. His study concluded that the Soviet leaders were attempting to fall back on ideology as a source of discipline, seeking to divorce themselves only from Stalin's counter-productive methods of purge and terror. In a long and documented version, this study was disseminated to OCB at their request. In a shorter version, it appeared as a Part III article in the OCI weekly publication as "Soviet Leaders Tighten Ideological Reins."

6. The second half of [] tour in the Soviet Staff of OCI was with the Military Division. There he did a study of the new role of aviation in Soviet military doctrine, by comparing captured Soviet field manuals with older comparable manuals. This article was published in Part II of the OCI weekly publication, and involved a good deal of coordination with an air force-navy team working on this problem in the Pentagon. He also did a study based on a reading of the Soviet military and general press on the increased role of surprise in broad Soviet strategic thinking. This article was also published in Part III of the OCI weekly. It covered a wide range of speeches, articles, and documents on the subject of surprise and atomic warfare -- only some of which had been previously used by the intelligence community. This article required coordination with [] and the answering of additional inquiries by the [] also prepared the Far Eastern section of the briefing book used by [] Chief of the Soviet Staff of OCI, in his official capacity as CIA briefing officer at the Summit Conference at Geneva in July.

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7. Upon his return to ONE in August 1955, [] was reassigned to the [] of our Estimates Staff because of previous commitments and existing requirements. Since that time, he has participated as a fully responsible member of the Staff in all the functions of this office. In particular, he wrote the initial draft of NIE 13-56 (Communist China), except for the economic section, and the initial draft of the Singapore section of the Malayan estimate (NIE 64-56).


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8. Based upon our observations to date, we consider [] performance, attitude, personality, and potential to be outstanding.

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Although still classified as a JOT, he exhibits the judgment, maturity, and perceptivity of an experienced intelligence officer. He has a great deal of initiative; he adapts himself readily; he writes well. Most importantly, he grasps the essentials of a problem easily and quickly and proceeds to a solution with a minimum requirement for supervision.


Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

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C O P Y

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		INITIALS	DATE	
1	IC/NE		?SW	29Dec55	
2	DTR		MB	3Jan56	
3	C/JOTP/TR				
4					
5	File				
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

"Maybe we were overly concerned about this assignment.
It looks good."

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FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
DAD/NE (PAB/eh)		12/29/55
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